By Bola A. Akinterinwa
The hoisting of Russian flags in Nigeria during recent protests suggests how President Tinubu’s ECOWAS foreign policy gambles might have triggered pro-Russian sentiments in Nigeria.
In Nigeria’s policy landscape, there is an ongoing assumption that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s foreign policy is a gamble; that Tinubu’s foreign policy approach might have triggered pro-Russian sentiments in Nigeria; and that it has not only been reciprocated but has also been done by Nigeriens. But all these assumptions reflect half-truths which are explicated here, along with the unbelievable-but-true statements.
To begin with the unbelievable truths: there is no Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) foreign policy peculiar to Tinubu that is different from that of the various regimes or administrations Nigeria has had. Nigeria’s foreign policies of ‘no compromise with apartheid’ and the non-acceptance of the exclusive use of Africa’s mineral resources for the development of Europe and America were rationales for the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, developed and adopted by Dr Jaja Wachukwu, the then minister of external affairs, and Dr Okoi Arikpo, commissioner for external affairs, respectively. These viewpoints gathered momentum in 1972, with the consideration of Africa as the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy—and later the ‘centrepiece’ in 1976—serving as a catalyst in the process. Tinubu’s predecessors in government, despite the planks in their own eyes, behaved like the ‘enforcers of justice’ in Africa in the spirit of a self-ascribed ‘Giant of Africa.’ Tinubu’s policy attitude is no different.
Secondly, it is quite difficult to differentiate between Tinubu’s foreign policy as president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Tinubu’s foreign policy as chairperson of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State. For instance, Niger-Nigeria bilateral ties are quite warm. When compared with the other neighbours of Nigeria, it is the only bilateral relationship devoid of any long-lasting international border dispute. In spite of ECOWAS’ military threat to compel the Abdourahamane Tchiani-led junta to release the ousted President Mohamed Bazoum, Niger-Nigeria military ties have not been terribly affected.
Nigeria’s chief of defence staff, General Christopher Musa, led a delegation to his Nigerien counterpart, General Moussa Salaou Barmou, in August 2024. This was possible because it is the same ethnic community of people that live on both sides of the Niger-Nigeria international border, which, at best, is porous. It is therefore difficult to argue here—on the basis of this relationship and the reason for the visit—that there has been foreign policy gambling. If there has been any gambling at all, it can only exist at the level of the ECOWAS policy attitude towards Niger.
Thirdly, the assumption that Tinubu’s foreign policy might have triggered pro-Russian sentiments in Nigeria cannot but be true. However, it is not the president’s foreign policy that has triggered the pro-Russian sentiments per se, but the seven-day ultimatum ECOWAS gave to the Republic of Niger. Nigeria took some sanctions against Niger because of the May 2024 coup ousting President Mohamed Bazoum—like cutting off electricity supply, which falls within the Niger-Nigerian bilateral commission framework for cooperation. Although one can argue that the measure was Nigerian in design and implementation, Nigeria actually acted in compliance with the supranational directives of the ECOWAS Authority but carelessly ignored the contractual obligations it had agreed to with Niger. Nevertheless, one could still argue that Tinubu engaged in political gambling with this decision.
TINUBU’S ECOWAS FOREIGN POLICY GAMBLE
As directed by the ECOWAS Authority, Dr Omar Touray, president of the ECOWAS Commission, announced ECOWAS’ seven-day ultimatum to Niger Republic on 30 July 2023. The ultimatum’s deadline was on 6 August 2023 and was disregarded by the Abdourahamane Tchiani-led military junta. On 10 August 2023, at the emergency meeting of the ECOWAS Authority, military intervention in Niger was authorized. This decision largely informed the meeting of the ECOWAS military chiefs on 17–18 August 2023, discussing the modalities for the military intervention.
However, in spite of the preparations for intervention, a force majeure, especially on the Nigerian side, did not easily allow for it. The Nigerian Senate, strongly believing in the principle of pacta sunt servanda—the sanctity of agreements—and also in compliance with Nigeria’s foreign policy directive contained in Section 19(d) of the Nigerian constitution (to have ‘respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication’), had very much constrained and compelled Tinubu to set aside the ECOWAS supranational directive for reasons along the lines of regional insecurity. Nigeria’s border communities have their kith and kin in the southernmost Niger border and as the same communities are divided by artificial international boundaries, senate representatives from northern Nigeria held that any war in Niger was also a war on Nigerians.
Second, most Nigerians living in Niger vehemently opposed any ECOWAS military intervention. Third, progressive-leftist and elite criticism that Tinubu was being teleguided by foreign and Global North powers did not bode well for Tinubu’s personality. Fourth, the Incorporated Trustees of Egalitarian Mission for Africa (EMA), I [Professor Bola Akinterinwa] and Barrister Nuhu Dantani took ECOWAS, Tinubu and three others to the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice to stop the intended military intervention. Dr Kayode Ajulo SAN—now commissioner for justice and attorney-general of Ondo State—who was the lead counsel, argued in the originating application that forceful intervention as a means of resolving disputes was not provided for in the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty, or as amended, and that not only would the military intervention have a deleterious impact, it would also derogate the human rights of ECOWAS citizens.
As a result of various pressures and divided international opinion, the agenda of the ECOWAS military intervention fell into désuétude—disuse. This development prompted lawyer Ifunanya Jemilla Okeke to file, on behalf of the applicants, an application for discontinuance for two major reasons: the ECOWAS sanctions imposed on Niger, which were very dire, had been lifted and because the live issues in the case had been overtaken by events. The three respondents did not object to the application for discontinuance and the case (vide suit no. ECW/CCJ/APP/31/23) was struck out.
THE GAMBLE’S BLOWBACK
Without a whiff of doubt, ECOWAS played a risky game with its seven-day ultimatum to Niger. While it is true that the union was conceived to have supranational authority, it really does not have the necessary resources and pull in the event that breaches of its treaty obligations start to bite. Besides, the concession of part sovereignty by member states to ECOWAS does not mean that it cannot be withdrawn by giving a one-year written notice. Consequently, ECOWAS exaggerated its power by giving an ultimatum involving manu militari to Niger.
Additionally, Tinubu engaged in serious strategic miscalculations by not reckoning with the implications of the ultimatum for Niger-Nigeria relations. Nigeria’s former foreign minister and former permanent representative to the United Nations, Professor Ibrahim Agboola Gambari—in his foreign policy concentricism theory, which partitions the whole world into four main circles with Nigeria at its centre—rightly posited that at the innermost circle, Nigeria’s national security is intertwined with that of its immediate neighbours. Hence, every security calculation must be done in light of Niger’s interest as a result of the country being one of Nigeria’s immediate neighbours. It appears that Tinubu never considered this factor, only reckoning with his position as chairperson of the ECOWAS Authority.
Already, Tinubu had a crisis of legitimacy a few weeks before the inception of the Niger coup as his election as president was challenged in court. Thus, Tinubu needed international recognition to be able to run his government with integrity. Recognition of state is quite different from recognition of government. The non-recognition of a government does not impede the existence of Nigeria as a sovereign state. However, it can create difficulties when entering into diplomatic ties. Consequently, Tinubu has to accept the wishes of some traditional and imperialist allies of Nigeria in order to survive. More interestingly, being seen as a primus inter pares, first among equals, in the continuum of African leadership was another important factor in Tinubu’s gamble. The president wanted to be seen as an actionable and stalwart authority. The domestic observers in Nigeria were suspicious of his integrity. He therefore needed to present himself better than he was being perceived by others. In fact, the Tchiani-led coup provided a unique opportunity for Tinubu to salvage his image as an acceptable and strong leader but at the risk of serious damage to the Niger-Nigeria relationship.
The reaction of Niger to the ECOWAS’ ultimatum was swift. The Tchiani regime immediately began mobilization of Niger’s armed forces for a war that would eventually not take place. Evacuation of foreign nationals followed. Efforts to seek new diplomatic ties and strengthen old ones also began, with neighbouring military governments in Mali and Burkina Faso rallying in support. Even though Nigeria made efforts to douse the tensions, Niger was not convinced that its national security could be well protected by ECOWAS.
In March 2024, Niger renounced their military agreement with the United States and then telephoned President Vladimir Putin of Russia to discuss ‘global strategic cooperation.’ When deposed President Bazoum filed a lawsuit before the ECOWAS Community Court in Abuja, on 18 September 2023, praying the court for his freedom and reinstatement, the Tchiani junta similarly filed a suit on 22 November 2023, asking the court to order the lifting of the ECOWAS sanctions, which the court rejected in December 2023.
The bitterness of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso with regard to their sovereignties and foreign interference is well summarized in the address of the Burkinabé minister of state, Bassolma Bazie, to the 78th United Nations General Assembly: vehement opposition to France and other foreign exploiters and neo-colonialists; determination to evolve a new democracy that will enable self-reliant development, protection of national sovereignty and sub-regional integration. This sentiment is the background to the shift from Western orientation in the political governance of Francophone West African countries to the new Russian direction.
PRO-RUSSIAN SENTIMENTS IN NIGERIA: INTERCONNECTED TRIGGERS
Pro-Russia sentiments are complex are multifaceted and manifest in the display of Russian flags in the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) countries. Although Russia has officially distanced itself from the 2024 #EndBadGovernance protests in Nigeria, claiming neither to support nor endorse them, Russia’s presence is growing in Nigeria and West Africa, and there are four main domestic and external dynamics that might have triggered pro-Russian sentiments in Nigeria.
First, in Niger Republic, the coup d’état that brought Tchiani to power was not the classical type that simply sought to overthrow the current government. With thousands of Nigeriens marching in support of the coup, the putschists, who appeared to typify anti-French colonialist sentiment, had popular support. The ousted President Bazoum was not only seen as a stooge of France but an instrument of French oppression and exploitation. When diplomatic ties with France became strained and military cooperation with the United States was also tainted, Tchiani, who did not have strong ties with President Putin before the strained relationship with France and the United States, was compelled to direct foreign policy focus towards the Kremlin.
It should be noted here that both Tchiani the ouster and Bazoum the ousted had their supporters. The Bazoum cabinet was divided—Tchiani having been the commander of Bazoum’s presidential guard—some supporting Bazoum while others supported Tchiani. The National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie, CNSP), Volunteers for the Defense of Niger (Volontaires pour la Défense du Niger, VDN), and the other AES countries (Mali and Burkina Faso) not only supported Tchiani’s government, Mali and Burkina Faso also argued that any attack on Niger was an attack on them. The additional support of the M62, a political movement in Niger, is particularly noteworthy. It was the M62 that organized anti-French demonstrations at the Place de la Concertation in front of the Nigerien National Assembly. M62 also vehemently opposed the Bazoum administration and France’s Operation Barkhane, a counterinsurgency military operation in the Sahel. As Niger cut ties with Ukraine in what is apparently in support of Russian invasion, the import of this situation is that there are sympathizers of Russia in Niger who are against France’s neo-colonial rule in the country.
President Bazoum and his supporters ignored the people’s complaints and quest for full political sovereignty, their agitations for self-reliance and their demands to end foreign exploitation of local resources. Bazoum’s supporters are basically the African Union, the European Union, the United Nations, the United Kingdom, the United States and France. They all ignored the people’s protests against bad governance and foreign exploitation and wrongly overemphasized zero tolerance for the unconstitutional change of government to the detriment of the people’s legitimate concerns. In ending France’s mainmise in Niger, the coup in Niger is the people’s coup and its vehicle the Nigerien military.
Second, domestically, in Nigeria, it can be argued that some Nigeriens who were not happy with the hostile attitude of Nigeria towards the new government of Niger might have infiltrated the #EndBadGovernance protests in Nigeria and carried Russian flags. True, Nigeriens and Nigerians are ECOWAS citizens and can reside in any part of the ECOWAS region. Nigeriens and Nigerians also have ties that go beyond the diplomatic and into the familial. A Nigerien in Nigeria is not a foreigner, and there are bound to be Nigeriens in Nigeria who are supporters of the Tchiani regime or Nigerians with ties to Niger who might have seen or heard the events of the Tchiani regime, including the pro-Russian demonstrations, play out. Security control of Nigeriens during sanctions for the coup, which included a closed Nigeria-Niger border, might have also proved difficult because of Niger-Nigeria’s long and porous borders of about 1,600 kilometres of which seven of Nigeria’s 36 states share with Niger.
Third, at the international level, there is the factor of the Wagner Group, a private military organization identified as working for the Russian government, though not openly so acknowledged. Niger sees the Wagner Group as being more helpful in the achievement of AES security objectives than the French and the Americans are, even if the group is also reportedly exploiting the local resources.
Another critical international trigger is the United States’ admission on 10 October 2023 that the military take-over of power in Niger was a coup, prompting the application of Section 7008 of the Department of State’s annual appropriations act. The legislation suspended some $200 million in development aid, which angered Niger. Additionally, the US Department of State’s delegation to Niamey led by the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Molly Phee, and the United States Africa Command commander General Michael Langley did much damage to the Niger-US relationship. The delegation wanted to see Tchiani but was allegedly disallowed because of their low-level ranking. Nevertheless, they warned Niger against partnering with Russia and Iran, which greatly angered the Tchiani regime who considered this an infringement of Niger’s political sovereignty.
Most importantly, there is the deepening dissatisfaction of Nigerians at home and in the diaspora with the government of Tinubu. This dissatisfaction traces back to the 20 October 2020 #EndSARS protests under Tinubu’s predecessor Muhammadu Buhari and even before then. Political governance under Tinubu has not brought about situational improvement. In fact, political governance in Nigeria continues to be fraught with much chicanery and institutional corruption to the extent that many people, including former president Olusegun Obasanjo, have been calling for the review of Nigeria’s liberal democracy. The life-made-difficult situation in Nigeria prompted the 1-10 August 2024 #EndBadGovernance protests during which Russian flags were displayed ‘as a tactic to draw international attention to Nigeria’s internal struggles and garner support from powerful nations,’ to borrow the words of Kunle Fasasi, a Lagos-based public affairs analyst at Bolytag Centre for International Diplomacy and Strategic Studies.
Professor Tunde Emmanuel, dean of the Faculty of Engineering and Technology, Lead City University, Ibadan, also added:
A flag is a symbol of what any people represents. Nigeria’s national flag represents peace, harmony and wealth. The people who carried foreign flags appeared not to believe in these ideals anymore. So they expressed their frustration by trying to display the Russian flag with little or no understanding of its implications.
In essence, the retaliation by Nigeriens in Niger and Nigeria to Tinubu’s and ECOWAS’ foreign policy gambles appear to have triggered pro-Russian sentiments in Nigeria. The progress being made in Burkina Faso, thanks particularly to Russia, appears to have inspired the protesters carrying the Russian flags. With Russia being held as the bastion of anti-establishment and anti-colonialist sentiments in Africa, it is quite likely that this belief will only continue to grow and reversibility only be possible if the perception of imperialism is first addressed and thrown into the garbage of history⎈
Bola A. Akinterinwa
holds a PhD degree in International Relations from the University of Paris-Sorbonne. He was former Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and currently Professor of International Relations at the Achievers University in Owo, Ondo State.