Although the re-election of Donald Trump was always a strong possibility, his success at the polls must have sent shockwaves through Jordan’s political establishment.
Most world leaders have made positive statements about the upcoming Trump presidency in a bid to hedge against unexpected US policy movements – and Jordan is no different. The government’s official position is that US–Jordan relations are multidimensional, multifaceted, highly institutionalized and will therefore remain strong.
But the return of Trump does not bode well for Jordan given his indifference towards the kingdom the first time around. Jordan has three key reasons to be concerned.
Jordan’s relevance to the US will diminish for at least another four years – and the consequences will be more far-reaching this time around.
First, Trump will once again overlook the importance of Jordan to US interests in the Middle East. The US and Western countries have long considered the Hashemite kingdom to be a dependable and moderate security partner in the region owing to its historical ties and enduring relationship with Israel.
Until the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, Jordan had been one of only two Arab states to have signed a peace treaty with Israel. It not only afforded Jordan a special status in Middle East peace talks, but also made it the beneficiary of substantial US financial support.
However, the emergence of the Trump-sponsored Abraham Accords, which saw Israel establish full diplomatic relations with the UAE and Bahrain (and later Morocco and Sudan) undermined Jordan’s value to the US. It was no longer a unique actor in the region.
At the same time, the UAE’s value to the Trump administration increased, as Abu Dhabi’s leadership demonstrated a willingness to normalize ties with Israel comprehensively, including in areas such as technology, security, finance, healthcare and energy.
As such, the UAE’s ‘peace’ with Israel has far exceeded the ‘cold peace’ that has come to characterize relations between Amman and Tel Aviv. This brings with it the prospect of the US establishing a new regional security construct, further integrating Israel into the region along with the promise of major business deals.
Although President Biden quickly restored US–Jordan relations when he assumed office in 2021, Trump will be keen to breathe new life into the Abraham Accords, despite the profound changes in the regional security environment since he was last in office. This means Jordan’s relevance to the US will diminish for at least another four years – and the consequences will be more far-reaching this time around.
Second, given the nature of Trump’s relationship with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the policy positions of his new appointees – his pick for US ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, and his defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, among others – there is growing concern that the US will ‘greenlight’ Israel’s annexation of the West Bank or, at the very least, substantial parts of it. After all, Huckabee told Israel’s Army Radio in his first interview after his appointment was announced that ‘of course the annexation of Judea and Samaria is a possibility under a second Trump White House.’
Annexation and the population transfer that follows would pose a direct security threat to Jordan – one that the kingdom has characterized as an Israeli declaration of war.
The combination of Netanyahu wanting to capitalize upon Israel’s success at degrading Hamas and Hezbollah and Trump’s bombast makes the prospect of annexation seem increasingly likely. It is no longer simply rhetoric and a fringe idea in Israeli politics, but the ambition of vocal cabinet ministers, such as finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich.
Annexation and the population transfer that follows would pose a direct security threat to Jordan – one that the kingdom has characterized as an Israeli declaration of war. Egypt has resisted succumbing to population transfer from Gaza by refusing to receive Palestinian refugees and Jordan would do the same.
However, the consequences of accepting Palestinian refugees would be far greater for Jordan than for Egypt. Its population already comprises approximately over 60 per cent Jordanians of Palestinian heritage, as well as sizeable refugee populations from other neighbouring countries including Syria and Iraq.
Knowing that population transfer is never temporary, the Jordanian government would keep its borders closed to avoid a permanent change in the country’s demographics that could intensify the calls of extremist Israelis for Jordan to become Palestine – a view now shared by some cabinet ministers.
Instead, a major refugee crisis along the west bank of the River Jordan would unfold and the Jordanian government would come under tremendous pressure from its partners, especially the US, to change its policy. Refusing to do so would risk severely harming relations with the Trump White House.
Third, the US will intensify efforts at encouraging normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which – if successful – will cause a further drop in Jordan’s importance to Washington. Of even greater concern for Jordan is the possibility that Israel and the US will include a discussion about the custodianship of Al Aqsa and other Christian and Islamic holy sites in East Jerusalem in negotiations with Saudi Arabia.
The Hashemites, Jordan’s royal family, have been custodians of these sites since 1924, a position which was reaffirmed in the 1994 Israel–Jordan peace agreement and in the 2013 agreement between the Palestinian Authority and Jordan.
Saudi Arabia’s position could prove key in deterring Israel from annexing the West Bank, especially if Trump views the bigger prize as securing Saudi–Israel normalization.
With Jordan–Israel relations at their lowest point since 1994 and with Trump looking to make a deal, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that idealogues in his administration and the Israeli cabinet will seek to sweeten any deal by promising Saudi Arabia’s ruling Al Saud family the custodianship of Islam’s third holiest site.
Luckily for Jordan, Saudi Arabia has made clear that the Al Saud family recognize the Hashemites as the legitimate custodians of Jerusalem’s holy sites and that normalization with Israel will only be achieved if concrete progress is made towards establishing a Palestinian state.
Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s position could prove key in deterring Israel from annexing the West Bank, especially if Trump views the bigger prize as securing Saudi–Israel normalization and pressures Netanyahu against taking such a step. After all, the UAE set the precedent of stalling annexation when it agreed to sign the Abraham Accords. It is unsurprising, therefore, that both King Abdullah and Crown Prince Hussein of Jordan visited Riyadh last month to shore up relations.
The Abraham Accords and Israel–UAE normalization
While Jordan’s diplomatic efforts in Washington are likely to fall on deaf ears, it can try to mitigate some of the risks posed by a Trump presidency by working closely with its regional partners to send a message to the White House that regional security is best served by establishing a Palestinian state.
Responsibility also falls on the shoulders of Jordan’s European partners, who in the recent past have taken the country for granted, believing that it can absorb more refugees while remaining stable and moderate. They must also wake up to the risks and channel their collective diplomacy towards Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Tel Aviv and Washington.