Sudan’s army has rejected a call to return to peace talks with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces following a conversation between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the United States (US) Secretary of State Antony Blinken. On Tuesday, 4 June, the State Department said Blinken discussed with Burhan the need to end the war and resume stalled US-Saudi sponsored talks in Jeddah, but Malik Agar, Burhan’s number two on the country’s Transitional Sovereign Council, insisted they will not go. On 5 June, Sudan’s army-aligned foreign ministry welcomed an Egyptian invitation for a summit of civilian political groups but placed conditions on the types of groups and foreign actors invited.
This is a departure from the Sudanese Armed Forces’s position as recently as September 2023 when Gen. Burhan told the BBC that he was willing to sit down with Hemedti. One of the possible reasons for this about-turn could be connected with the fact that as of September, the RSF was on the ascendancy, having captured strategic areas, including major airports and the capital Khartoum, forcing the military government to move its operations to Port Sudan. In recent weeks, the SAF has gained territory in Khartoum and has strengthened its negotiating position.
Secondly, the internationalisation of the conflict has led to competing peace processes and centres. Although the most prominent are the US-backed peace talks in Jeddah and Riyadh, there are also mini-conferences in Cairo and Kanama. Importantly, the capitals where some of these talks are held are parties to the conflict. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for instance, support the SAF. The RSF’s major ally has been the United Arab Emirates. Hemedti’s tour of African capitals, such as Pretoria, Kigali and Nairobi, in search of recognition has also not done enough to foster peace talks.
With the recent entry of Russia into the conflict on the side of Al Burhan’s SAF (following Moscow’s interests in possible port deals), the preference for peace, especially for Al Burhan, is low. The international community’s knowledge and understanding that more than 5.5 million people have been displaced in the fighting should force both sides to the table; however, realistically, the chances of that happening are slim. Sudan ranks low on the priority list of international conflicts, and the parties supplying arms to both sides seem to believe that the potential genocide of thousands in Darfur is less significant than the political concessions they might gain by supporting the winning side.